Abstract-Linear cryptanalysis is a statistical analysis method. Linear cryptanalysis constructs probabilistic patterns first and then distinguishes the cipher from a random permutation using lots of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Linear cryptanalysis has a big data complexity. Algebraic attack attempts to exploit the algebraic structure of the cipher by expressing the encryption transformation as a set of polynomial equations and then attempts to solve the system to recover the encryption key. Algebraic attacks do not need too much data. This paper combines these two methods by using algebraic techniques in linear cryptanalysis, and proposes a new cryptanalysis method called Algebraic Techniques in Linear Cryptanalysis. This new method is used in the existing linear cryptanalysis of PRESENT. To recover 8-bit key information of 21-round PRESENT, the data complexity is 6 2 and the time complexity is 6 2 .Compared with the result of linear cryptanalysis, the data complexity is obviously decreased.
INTRODUCTION
A new cryptanalytic method against block cipher "Algebraic Techniques in Linear Cryptanalysis" is proposed by combining both algebraic attack and linear cryptanalysis. The new method is applied to the lightweight block cipher PRESENT. Similar to Algebraic Techniques in Differential Cryptanalysis, the new method constructs probabilistic patterns based on the algebraic structure of the algorithm and the linear trails, and then tries to recover the key by solving the system. In this way, the data complexity will be decreased obviously. This paper is structured as follows. First, the block cipher PRESENT is briefly described in section 2. Then linear cryptanalysis and algebraic attack are described in section 3.Section 4 gives the details of the new cryptanalytic method. Section 5 describes the application of the new attack against reduced round PRESENT. And a brief summary is presented in section 6.
II. BLOCK CIPHER PRESENT
The block cipher PRESENT was proposed by Bogdanov et al. at CHES 2007 as an ultra-lightweight block cipher [1] . PRESENT is an SP-network with a blocksize of 64 bits and consists of 31 rounds. Two key sizes of 80 and 128 bits are supported. Each round of the cipher has three layers: KeyAddLayer, SboxLayer and Player. In every round, a single 4-bit S-box is applied 16 times in parallel. 
III. BRIEF INTRODUCTIONS OF LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS AND ALGEBRAIC ATTACK

A. Linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis [2] [3] is a known plaintext attack. The basic idea is recovering some key bits by using the unbalanced linear approximations between plaintext, ciphertext and key of the cipher. Firstly, linear cryptanalysis needs to find an "effective" linear expression of a given cipher as follows: To find an effective linear approximation, the statistical method is used to give some linear approximations of the input and the output of the main part of the round function. After connecting the approximations of each round and eliminating the intermediate variables, approximations called linear trails which only involve the plaintext、the ciphertext and the key will be received. If an effective linear expression is already known, then a key bit can be tested as follows:
(1) Let T be the number of the plaintexts which satisfy that the left of the equation equals to 0. known plaintexts are needed, t is a constant.
B. Algebraic attack
The basic idea of algebraic attack [3] [4] can be described as follows: (1)express the cipher as simple equations of several variables and these variables can be some fixed bits(or bytes) of plaintext、ciphertext and the key, or some bits of the intermediate state and the round subkeys;(2) substitute the equations in (1) with the collected plaintext-ciphertext pairs and try to solve the equations to recover the key.
IV. ALGEBRAIC TECHNIQUES IN LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS
When algebraic attack is applied to a cipher, firstly the cipher will be expressed into a system of equations, then by solving the system some related key bits can be recovered. In order to make the system easy to solve, the problem how to increase the number of linear equations is considered [5] .
Assume a equation system F are the same, the intermediate variables are not absolutely the same. That is to say, while with the number of the equations is increased, the number of unknown variables in the system is also increased [5] . So another method is considered by applying the characteristic of linear approximations in Method-1.
A. Method-1
Assume the target cipher is an example of SP-network, and a linear trail According to the Piling-Up Lemma of Matsui [2] , approximations of each round can be considered as mutually independent, so the probability of Δ can be F . However, to solve such a big system 1/ P times directly is also very difficult, so the following method-2 considers another way to recover the key to avoid this problem.
B. Method-2
Still assume the cipher is an example of SP-network. A linear trail is known with same probability P . A plaintext-ciphertext pair ( , ) P C is called a right pair if it satisfies the linear trail Δ . For the sake of simplicity, the following analysis is based in the assumption that there is only one active S-box in the first round. And its input is 1 j X and output is 1 j Y . Then
P C is a right pair, there must be: K . So on the premise of a known right pair, a small system can be set up for each active S-box in the first round to recover some information of the first round key. And similarly, this method can be used to recover some information of the last round key. Let rj X be the input and rj Y be the output of the last round, then there is:
Set up the small system, and some information of the last round key can be recovered by solving the system.
The premise of Method-2 is a known right pair of the linear trail, so the next task is to consider how such a right pair can be obtained.
Here system ' 
F F F
= ∪ in Method-1 can be a filter. 1 t is denoted as the time to judge a right pair(determined by experiment) , and the time to judge a wrong pair is no more than 1 t . A pair ( , ) P C is substituted into the system F . If in time 1 t , there is no conflict, ( , ) P C will be a right pair of the linear trail. By this way, after a right pair is obtained, the small system in Method-2 can be constructed to recover the key information.
Observe the process of the key recovery in Method-2, it only related to the approximations of the active S-boxes in the first and last round, but has no relation to the intermediate states of the linear trail Δ . This characteristic is similar to linear hull. So the linear trails will be replaced by linear hull in constructing the filtration system.
Assume an r-round linear hull 0 r δ δ → and a corresponding right pair is already obtained. Then similarly the small system in Method-2 can be used to recover the key. 
The above system is denoted as  F . The probability of  F is about 1 2 (1/ 2) n n + , 1 n , 2 n are the numbers of active S-boxes in the first an last round respectively, and 1 2 n n n + <= . Construct system  ' F F F = ∪ , and F can be a filtration system. In F ,  F is much more simple than F in Method-1. Precisely,  F is achieved from F by removing the equations corresponding to the active S-boxes in the middle round. And the equations corresponding to the last and first round active S-boxes constitutes  F .The probability of  F is about 1 2 (1/ 2) n n + , larger than (1/ 2) n in Method-1. That is to say, after 1 2 (1/ 2) n n + times filtering operations, rather than (1/ 2) n times in linear trail situation, a right pair can be expected. The decrease of filtering is the advantage of using linear hull instead of linear trails. At the same time, the number of equations in the filtration system is also decreased, then the time to judge a right pair (denoted as 2 t )will be shorter than 1 t .
V. APPLY THE NEW METHOD TO PRESENT
A. A single linear trail
There is a 21-round linear trail of PRESENT-80 [4] : A is obtained, the small system can be constructed for 10 S in the first round, and simplify it: 
